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The Influences of Sufism and Kejawen in Indonesian Political Discourse

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Brett J. McCabe

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Student Name (print or type): Brett McCabe

Faculty Supervisor (print or type): Andrea K. Molnar P.H.D

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ABSTRACT:

In current affairs a central issue in the media is Islamic fundamentalism. Various reactions to American foreign policy have divided the globe into a dichotomy supporting or rejecting terrorism. While Middle Eastern countries have received significant attention, other Islamic countries have been largely ignored. Indonesia can be a primary example for an analysis of how Islam exists outside of the Middle East.

The purpose of this research is to consider the initial development of political Islam in Indonesia. This development will consider the level of influence Islam had during the drafting of the Indonesian constitution. Also, this research will show the dynamics of Islam in a multi-ethnic and diverse country.

The research is designed as a historical-cultural analysis that considers the influences of two belief systems (*Sufism* and *kejawen*)[1] during Indonesia's initial political discourse. The nationalist leader and first Indonesian president, Soekarno, will be used to illustrate this influence.

[1] Sufism is the mystical form of Islam and *kejawen* (Javanism) is a Javanese belief system.

Introduction

In current affairs a central issue in the media is Islamic fundamentalism. Various reactions to American foreign policy have divided the globe into a dichotomy supporting or rejecting terrorism. Minorities of Muslims have initiated a *jihad* (holy war) on the Western world with the goal of destroying belief systems of anything differing from their radical Islamic views. Such fundamentalists show no signs of accepting anything less than a complete Islamic society governed by an Islamic state.[1]

The countries that have attracted the most attention are Iraq, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Other countries with large populations of Muslims, particularly Indonesia, have remained out of the media. This is odd; Indonesia has a functional democracy with a dominant Muslim population, which is something that many Westerners believe cannot exist. Moreover, Indonesia has largely rejected the notion of instituting *Sharia* (Islamic Law) as a primary factor in their political system (Fealy and Hooker 2006: 39, 46, 47). Thus, Indonesia may serve as a primary example of how Islam exists outside of the Middle East; this form of Islam is ignored by the mainstream media's representations.

Indonesia has a total population of 214,995,000 people. There are 189,195,000 Muslims, which is roughly 88% of the population of Indonesia. This is the largest concentration of Muslims out of any nation; this is roughly 13% of the worlds 1.3 billion Muslims (Fealy and Hooker 2006: 7, 39).[2] While many Americans have a notion of what it means to be a Muslim or what Islam entails, it is likely a misinformed perception. Moderate Muslims and Muslim

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[1] The word *jihad* means *struggle*. *Jihad* has been misused an misunderstood primarily due to Islamic fundamentalists using it to define their war against non-Muslims, particularly the United States and the greater Western World.

[2] The first set of numbers are taken from Indonesia's central statistics agency, Biro Pusat Statistik (reported in the Jakarta Post, 4 July 2003), compiled for the 2004 general elections. These numbers were part of a larger table of total populations of Southeast Asian countries in Fealy and Hooker 2006 *Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia: a Contemporary Sourcebook* Pasir Panjang Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies pp. 7.

intellects far outweigh the radical fundamentalists; yet do not attract the attention of the major media outlets. While there are a variety of factors explaining why Islam is misunderstood, the first step in attempting to understand Islam is to move beyond common stereotypes and representations. Once again, Indonesia can be a primary example of Islam existing and functioning in diverse and pluralistic environments.

The purpose of this research is two-fold. First, this research will show the initial development of political Islam in Indonesia. This development will consider the level of influence Islam had in the initial drafting of the Indonesian constitution. Secondly, this research will provide an example of how Islam can function in a diverse region such as Indonesia. To clarify, Indonesia has a wide range of ethnic groups on the archipelago. The Island with the highest concentration of Muslims is Java with 94.1% (Fealy and Hooker 2006: 39). Even with this large majority, there is still a large degree of variation between the types of practicing Muslims in Java.

The Island of Java will be the centerpiece for this paper because; it was central in the Indonesian independence movement. A historical-cultural framework will be used to explain Islam's role into the initial Indonesian political system at the time of independence. There will be a discussion of *kejawen* (Javanism) and the *Sufi* belief system of the Islamic religion.[3] Both are important when understanding Islam in Indonesia.

There will also be specific attention paid to the Islamic organizations Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, and Masyumi. All have played a significant role in Indonesia. This will provide an example of specific versions of Islam and also consider the labels 'traditionalist' and modernist'. When understanding Islam's role in Indonesian society, it is important to look at

[3] *Sufism* is the mystical interpretation of Islam. *Kejawen* is a world-view and ideology that is strictly characteristic of the Javanese.

Islamic organizations. Moreover, the account of Islamic organizations will provide an understanding of how Islam has functioned in Indonesia. In short, the account of Islamic groups will organize the large presence of Islam and how it exists in Indonesia.

The early political discourse in Indonesian politics will include the initial drafting of the Indonesian constitution. More specifically, there will be a discussion on Indonesia's first president, Soekarno, and his ideologies.

Soekarno's ideologies will provide an example of how diverse ideologies were brought together and the role Islam played during the development of the Indonesian constitution. Soekarno and the *Djakarta Charter*[4] will be used to show the first political division between those Muslims who support a large Islamic influence in state ideology and those who do not (Fealy and Hooker 2006: 47). Moreover, Soekarno's ideology will connect the previous examples of *kejawen* and *Sufism* to the influences during independence and the outcome of the constitution.

The first section will discuss the political environment of Indonesia during the 1900's to 1945. There will be an overview of Islam and Islamic communities, as they exist in Indonesia. An account of the developments of Islamic organizations and Muslim classifications will be considered, as well as the competing ideologies in Indonesia during the 1900's. Moreover, the Japanese occupation will be noted as it affected the major Islamic groups. Last, a brief introduction of Soekarno's ideology will be incorporated (Armstrong 2002; Barton and Fealy 1996; Beatty 1999; Fealy and Hooker 2006; Fieth and Castles 1970; Kahin 1952; Momen 1985; Mulder 1996; Ricklefs 1993).

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[4] A clause that was rejected in the drafting of the Indonesian constitution that allows for the institution of *sharia* law. The seven words in bahasa Indonesian were: *Dengan kewajiban menjalankan syari'at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya*. These words obliged the state to implement *sharia* and Muslims to follow it (Fealy and Hooker 2006: 47).

The second section will discuss Javanese *kejawen* and *Sufi* mysticism. This portion will show how Soekarno's ideologies were affected by these two belief systems and also illustrate the diverse and syncretic environment of Java. To clarify, when comparing *kejawen* and *Sufism* there will be attention paid to cosmology, mythology, metaphysics, and anthropology (mans place in the universe). Moreover, there will be a consideration of the origins of *Sufi* influences in Java and the divisions between the legal and mystical aspects of Islam. Last, there will be an explanation of the proposed universal principles that augment *kejawen* and *Sufism* (Beatty 1999; Endraswara 2003; Fealy and Hooker 2006; Geertz 1960; Mulder 1996; Ricklefs 1993; Woodward 1989).

The final section will discuss *Sufi* and Javanese ideology during the initial political development in Indonesia. This portion will consider the common aspects of a charismatic leader in reference to Soekarno. Soekarno's background and early political influences will be discussed and how these early influences cultivated Soekarno's ideologies. Furthermore, it is important to mention Soekarno's isolation because; this is where he began to consider Islam. This will illustrate and explain how the previous *Sufi* and *kejawen* ideologies link to Soekarno's political agenda. Finally, there will be a discussion of Soekarno's return from isolation during the Japanese occupation and the subsequent declaration of independence (Bharadwaj 1997; Dham 1969; Fealy and Hooker 2006; Legge 1972).

Thus, this paper will consist of three sections. The first section is a background of the political environment during Indonesia's move toward independence. The second is a discussion of *Sufism* and *kejawen*. Last, Soekarno's ideology and the drafting of the constitution during Indonesia's independence. These three areas will give us an understanding of the role of Islam in

Indonesia's initial political development. More specifically, these areas will show what role specific forms of Islam played during the formation of the Indonesian constitution.

Background

Islam is a monotheistic religion that originated from the teachings of the prophet Muhammad, who was both a religious and a political figure. Muhammad was the author of the Qur'an, which is the sacred religious text that is central to Islamic teachings.[5] Initially, the Qur'an was passed orally from Muhammad to his religious leaders. After Muhammad's death in 632 AD, the Qur'an was interpreted and taught through the four rightly guided caliphs who succeeded Muhammad. The word *Islam* means *submission*; that is, the total surrender to *Allah* (God). A follower of Islam is a Muslim; literally *one who submits to Allah*. Islam is the second largest religion in the world next to Christianity (Armstrong 2002: xiv, 25)[6]. There are various forms of Islam; the most basic division is between the *Sunni* and *Shiite* groups. This division resulted from a disagreement between the successor to Islam after the prophet's death and the role of that successor (Momen 1985: 12).

In Indonesia, there is a wide spectrum of *ummah* (Islamic communities). This diversity includes ethnic groups, socio-economic classes, political and doctrinal orientations, and cultural dispositions. How to classify these *ummah* has been debated by scholars; however, since the nineteenth century four categories have dominated literature; the *santri*, *abangan*, traditionalists, and modernists[7]. Traditionalists and moderates are considered sub categories of the *santri*. *Santri*

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[5] It should be noted that while references may show Muhammad as the 'author' of the Qur'an, Muslim's believe the author is *Allah* (God), who used the prophet to create the holy book.

[6] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam, http://en.wikipedia.orh/wiki/muhammad.

[7] For more information on classification see Clifford Geertz 1960 *The Religion of Java*, Chicago: the University of Chicago Press and M.C.Rickfels 2006 *Mystic Synthesis in Java: A History of Islamisation from the Fourteenth to the Early Nineteenth Centuries*, New York: Eastbridge, White Plains.

and *abangan* are terms used to denote Islamic piety, where the *santri* are those Muslims who adhere to the strict doctrine of Islam and the *abangan* Muslims are those who are less orthodox or 'nominal'. The ab*angan* practices range widely in practice, depending on the individual Muslim. The *abangan* Muslims are those whose lives have a more syncretic blend of Islam with various other religions; whereas to the *santri*, the tenants and principles of Islam are central and defining. Islam in Indonesia can exist in with elements of Hinduism, Buddhism, and local animistic belief practices. (Fealy and Hooker 2006: 39, 40).

Within the *santri* are the traditionalists and moderates, who are divided by doctrinal differences, which often have socioeconomic, political, and cultural interests. Traditionalists have two important characteristics. The first is that they wish to preserve the authoritative early Islamic scholarship and the second is that they tend to be more tolerant of local customs. This is important because it allows local beliefs and practices to augment Islam. For example, the veneration of *wali* (saints) and well-known *kyai* and *ulama* (Islamic scholars) can be intermediaries between God and humans. The largest traditionalist organization is Nahdlatul Ulama (NU-Revival of the Religious Scholars), this group is dominated by Islamic scholars whose authority is based on the knowledge of classical Islam, NU's membership claims 35 to 40 million people (Fealy and Hooker 2006: 39, 40).

The modernists (or reformists) believe that the theology and ritual practices of the traditionalists are impure and deviate from the original teachings of Islam. The modernist movement spread to Indonesia in the early twentieth century prior to the traditionalist movement. The modernists critique the traditionalists in two important areas. The first is that un-Islamic innovations during the medieval and early modern periods corrupted the Islamic the faith and led Muslims to error. The second is that blind adherence to a past dogma has led to the stagnation,

atrophy, and eventual irrelevance of Islam during colonial dominance in Indonesia. Modernists claim the only way to revive Islamic relevance in contemporary Indonesia is to remove these impurities and return to the teachings of the Qur'an and the examples of the prophet Muhammad. Modernists believe that Muslims should learn from Western advances to strengthen and modernize the Muslim community. The largest modernist organization is Muhammadiyah with a membership of 25 to 30 million people (Fealy and Hooker 2006: 39-41).

It is important to note here, that the terms 'traditionalist' and 'modernist' can be misleading. Some may assume that the term 'traditional' equates to a form of religious conservatism, unwilling to consider local belief systems; however, it is the traditionalists and NU that show tolerance toward these local beliefs and practices. Likewise, the term 'modernist' would seemingly indicate an acceptance toward syncretic blends of Islam and flexibility in doctrine; to the contrary, the modernists quickly rejected Soekarno's interpretations of Islam. The orthodox traditionalists showed interest in Soekarno's emphasis on the importance of syncretism (Dahm 1969: 196).

To understand how Islam exists in such a diverse region and how Islamic ideals have influenced Indonesian politics, the activities of three important Islamic groups during the development of Indonesian nationalism must be accounted for. These three groups originated on the Island of Java. As mentioned earlier, ideological concepts of pre-Islamic Javanese belief systems and how these beliefs have been incorporated into Islam is important.

The island of Java is located south of Borneo (Kalmiantan) and east of Sumatra. Java has a 94.1 % Muslim majority; however, there exists a worldview that is strictly isolated to Javanese pre-Islamic beliefs. However, Islam and Javanese traditional thought exists inclusively rather than exclusively. The effects of Islamic piety on Javanese worldview weighted in *Sufism* will

show how Islamic ideologies act in conjuncture with Javanese worldview (Fealy and Hooker 2006: 49; Mulder 1996: 31; Beatty 1999:1).

Initial political thought in Indonesia was fundamentally rooted in nationalism. The development of independence in Indonesia was a time of intense turmoil. There was a large degree of political and ideological competition and conflict. Indonesian students, who were foreign educated, systematically assessed the Dutch colonial government and showed their desires for an independent Indonesian state.[8] These ideals were the beliefs of secular and non-secular reformist Muslims, the ideology of Marxist-Communism, and pro-and anti-Japanese nationalism. The development of Islamic groups and their ideologies had a significant influence on the development of Indonesia as an independent nation (Feith and Castles 1970: 1; Kahin 1952: 64). More specifically, the development of the groups Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, and Masyumi, played a large role in the independence of Indonesia and its initial political formation. While these groups were initially apolitical, the environment of Indonesia in the twentieth century ensured that these groups would gain political awareness (Feith and Castles 1970: 1; Kahin 1952: 64).

Muhammadiyah was established in 1912 in Yogyakarta, Central Java by Kiaji Ahmad Dahlan. This is a modernist organization that was initially apolitical, remaining Java-centric until Dahlan's death in 1923. Originally centered on schools, Muhammadiyah expanded its influence to free clinics, poor relief, orphanages, libraries and publications of the Qur'an in the Javanese language. While Muhammadiyah's original purpose was enriching Muslim culture, the environment of nationalism in the early twentieth century gave members of Muhammadiyah the drive to become politically active. Eventually Muhammadiyah's schools were utilized as areas

[8] The Dutch occupied and had a presence in Indonesia for nearly 300 years; where it was considered part of The Dutch East Indies. For more information see Anthony Reid 1990 *Southeast Asia in The Age of Commerce* Yale University Press

for promoting nationalism (Kahin 1952: 87-88). However, Ricklefs (1993) contends that Muhammadiyah faced significant resistance initially and the real growth of the organization was between 1925 and 1938 when it linked to the dynamic Islamic world of Minangkabau (Ricklefs 1993: 171).

While Muhammadiyah is the largest modernist organization in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), is the largest traditionalist movement in Indonesia. NU was formed in response to the growing influence of the modernist movement led by Muhammadiyah. The purpose and mission of NU was to defend the traditional forms of Islamic beliefs and practices against some of the modernist views being spread by Muhammadiyah. Wahab Chasbullah and Hasjim Asj'ari (Chasbullah's mentor) organized NU in competition with Muhammidiyah for members and affiliates between the traditional and conservative ideologies of Islamic beliefs (Feith and Castles 1970: 201).

While during the 1920's and early 1930's, the two parties were in competition, the 1940's brought a period of consolidation and cooperation. In 1937 at Chasbullah's Surabaya house, the representatives from Saraket Islam[9], NU, and Muhammadiyah consolidated to form the Majlis Islam A'laa Indonesia (MIAI), with the central role of Chasbullah as a major influence and factor (Barton & Fealy 1996: 1-13; Fealy & Hooker 2006: 17, 27).

During the 1940's there was a significant split in NU. This split resulted in ideological differences between two lines of thinking in NU. This is a division of two ideological belief systems and pushed the NU leadership into two polarities; the hardliners and the pragmatists. The hardliners were those who supported a rigid adherence to doctrinal and spiritual law. These individuals encompassed Islamic intellectualism and had an exclusive Islamic train of thought.

[9] The Islamic association formed in 1912 (successor to Sarekat Dagang Islamiyah [Islamic Comeercial Union, 1909]) and later renamed as the political party Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, which had little political success (Fealy and Hooker 2006: xlvii)

The hardliners vehemently supported the notion of an Islamic state and demanded the formal recognition of *Sharia* law in the Indonesian constitution. The hardliners called for cooperation strictly between Islamic groups over non-Islamic groups and secularists. With the hardliners, there was no room for political dealings and compromise, nor was there an acceptance of syncretic blends of Islam (Barton and Fealy 1996: 18, 19).

The hardliners counterparts, the pragmatists, took a less doctrinal approach to policymaking and action. The pragmatist's interpretation of *Sharia* law took a flexible and realist approach. The pragmatists utilized vague and flexible interpretations to Islamic legalities. For example, *akhaffud-dararain* (choosing the lesser of two risks), was commonly used in political decision making and the pragmatists were much more cautious about the idea of an Islamic state. The notion of an Islamic State is still highly contested in contemporary Islamic circles. The reason for this caution is the risk of alienating non-Muslims in Indonesia; the pragmatists had doubts that an Islamic state would result in a more Islamic society (Barton and Fealy 1996: 19, 20).

Muhammadiyah and NU are important examples for this research because they represent the flexibility of Islam, enabling it to exist in a diverse environment. While this paper will focus more on NU, it is important to introduce Muhammadiyah because Muhammadiyah was responsible for the development of NU. Also, these groups help to organize Islam on a larger scale, as it exists in Indonesia. The contrasts seen between modernists and traditionalists can also exist in individual groups.

For example, NU has similar internal conflictions between the hardliners and pragmatists. These internal conflictions can be used to illustrate diversity and tolerance within the traditionalist Muslim system. These conflictions also allow for a large amount of ideological

flexibility within NU. The example of the hardliners and pragmatists within the NU organization shows that, although there is opposition, the group can still function as a whole and the diversity in these groups can attend to the diversity between the *santri* and *abangon* in Indonesia, particularly in Java (Kahin 1952: 106-110).

The Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1945 resulted (among many other things) in the establishment of an Indonesian army. This was essential to the Indonesian nationalist movement and subsequent independence. Also, the Japanese used Muslim fighters to resist a Dutch invasion. The methods they used are important because it provides an example of an attempt to consolidate the major Islamic organizations to control the Islamic population of Indonesia. The Japanese plans involved coercing the Indonesians using religion. The Japanese were unsuccessful because, they created a larger organization (Masyumi) to communicate with the underground resistance networks. The Masyumi organization, formed by the Japanese, worked as a nationalist movement seeking independence, while at the same time convincing the Japanese of their cooperation. Masyumi was the consolidation of the Islamic groups (the largest being Muhammadiyah and NU) under the Japanese occupation (Kahin 1952: 106-110; Barton and Fealy 1996: 17).

During the Japanese occupation, local Islamic leaders such as Chasbullah of NU were appointed to respected local positions, such as *Shu Sangi Kai* (the Regional Advisory Council). When the Japanese were defeated in 1945, the organization of Masyumi, still with the groups Muhammadiyah, NU, and Parai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, emerged as a distinct group. The chief objective was a functional independent Indonesia based on Islamic principles. However, the disagreement between the parties was in the interpretation of what Islamic principles should be implemented and how those principles should be applied. Once again there was a division of

ideologies, with the traditionalists primarily from NU and the modernist reformers from Muhammadiyah. The Muhammadians in this group were a new and ambitious force with ideological goals to shape, influence, and eventually mold their society (Kahin 1952: 110, 111, 156; Barton and Fealy 1996: 17, 18; Fealy and Hooker 2006 xliii).

In the early 1950's NU split from Masyumi and caused an upheaval and rapid change that had far reaching consequences in the Islamic world and in Indonesian politics. The new generation of Muhammadian modernists won significant control and influence over the board of Masyumi. This gave the Muhammadians more control over the progressiveness in the Masyumi organization. Essentially, the modernists, led by Mohammad Natsir, challenged the political competency of the NU *kyai* an *ulama*, and changed the rules of the board to limit the influence of the *Shu Sangi Kai*, chaired by Chasbullah. This resulted in an NU walkout by their delegates, followed by the formal proposal for a withdrawal from Masyumi. NU's split from Masyumi resulted in significant and rapid change in the Islamic world (Barton and Fealy 1996: 21; Kahin 1952: 156).

The description of the formations and ideologies of these Islamic groups shows the diverse interactions between the various forms of Islamic thinking. Also, this account assists in the organization of the dynamics of Islam in Indonesia. The traditionalists, moderates, hardliners, pragmatists, and reformists were all seemingly at odds with how to implement Islamic ideologies in the newly forming Indonesian nation. The leaders of the revolution were now in prominent political positions of government and intensely pushing their ideologies. The compromise that allowed for controlled Islamic influence, while also curbing the formation of an Islamic state,

was the concept of *pancasila* (the five principles)[10] formulated by Indonesia's first president Soekarno (Feith and Castles 1970: 123).

Soekarno framed *pancasila* in a way that could be understood by the uneducated masses, but also appeal to the educated elite Indonesians who had similar nationalist and secular views. The nature of *pancasila* was influenced by Western Democracy, Moderate Islamic tendencies, Marxist ideals, and indigenous-village democratic and communalistic ideas, which formulated the general basis of social thought in Indonesia in the early twentieth century (Feith and Castles 1970: 123).

Thus, *pancasila* was applicable to a variety of Indonesians with diverse ideologies, which seemingly defined Indonesia during the independence period. *Pancasila* is still applicable in contemporary Indonesia and still at the core of the constitution. P*ancasila* has five principles; the identification and belief in one supreme God, a just and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberation amongst representatives, and the social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia (Fealy and Hooker 2006: 44).

While this appeals to various ideologies, one of the primary purposes for Soekarno's *pancasila* was to prevent an Islamic state. *Pancasila* was more supportive of the moderate Islamic standpoint that addressed the concerns of the non-Muslims, who threatened to separate from Indonesia if it became an Islamic state. Elections in Indonesia have shown that the position of Islam as a primary governmental force is not welcome by the majority of the country. Even with Indonesia's 88% Muslim majority, the largest support for Islamic parties in Indonesian elections was in 1955, when the combined results for the Islamic parties were about 40% (well

[10] *Pancasila*, or the 'five principles' declare the belief in one God, a just and civilized society, national unity, democracy led by wisdom, and social justice (Fealy and Hooker 2003: xiv).

below the majority needed). The Islamic groups anticipated a much larger number than they received. Islamic parties have never gained more than 44% of the vote in general elections and have not been successful in 'Islamizing' the Indonesian government (Fealy and Hooker 2006: 44, 45).

Soekarno's *pancasila* provided the basis for the constitution and a compromise between the competing ideologies in Indonesia; however, debates and conflictions still exist within the Islamic groups. Both in the past and present, debates still remain about what constitutes an Islamic state and, indeed, if the concept of an Islamic state is flawed at the core. The role of Islam in Indonesian society and what specific laws to implement are still largely debated and contested ideologies in contemporary Indonesian politics (Fealy and Hooker 2006: 209-219).

We have an overview of the development of Indonesia as a nation state in relationship to the influential Islamic groups. To illustrate how a form of Islam can augment another belief system in a diverse environment, *Kejawen* and *Sufism* will be discussed. *Sufi* ideology combined with the Javanese belief system of *kejawen* (Javanism), will illustrate how the synergy between two belief systems can affect the outcome of Soekarno's *pancasila* ideology and subsequent policy.

Javanese Kejawen and Sufi Mysticism

This portion of the paper will discuss *kejawen* (Javanism) and *Sufi* mysticism. *Kejawen* and *Sufism* are an important aspect of Islam in Java because; both play an intricate role in Javanese thought. This will show how aspects of both beliefs contributed to Soekarno's *pancasila* ideology. To compare the two there will be an explanation of cosmology, mythology, metaphysics, and anthropology in *kejawen* and *Sufism*. More specifically, the understanding of *rasa* (feeling), mans place in the universe (and mans relationship to God), and the macrocosms

and microcosms will be discussed. These elements will explain the complexity of *kejawen* and show the similarities of *kejawen* to *Sufism*. First, there will be a brief account of pluralism and syncretism, as it exists in Indonesia.

The island of Java exists in a pluralistic and syncretic environment. The idea that there is more than one basic principle, and reality consists of two or more independent elements is what defines pluralism. This condition is a condition such that, minority groups participate in the dominant society while maintaining their cultural distinctions. This definition assumes that society will benefit from such a condition (Random House Webster's College Dictionary 2001: 1019). Ideally, religious beliefs in a pluralistic environment will co-exist with major and minor ideological differences, and they do, however, these differences often lead to conflictions and in extreme cases violence. Pluralism exists in virtually every country on the globe. Every nation has various ethnicities isolated in given areas in large cities and in rural areas. However, in Indonesia, pluralism exists with a large degree of religious syncretism.

Syncretism can be defined in various ways, and can fit in various degrees and levels of any given condition. Syncretism can be the attempt to reconcile differences or establish a union of opposing ideologies, thus merging two or more opposing categories into one form (The Random House Webster's College Dictionary 2001: 1328). Mulder (1996: 7) notes the limitations of syncretism as the *universal outcome of cultural contact*, and opts for a larger explanation based on a given context. It is agreeable and important to provide a context for syncretism; however, a simple definition will suffice if it is understood that religious syncretism is a broad and complex condition.

In the case of Java, syncretism is a complex and a reoccurring process that is a constant and consistent concept, which relates to cultural reproduction. However, syncretism may not

necessarily provide a settled or significant outcome (Beatty 1999: 3). This is important to understand in terms of religious syncretism and particularly in this case, when the research moves to examples of *Sufi* influences in *kejawen* and Islam more generally. Both ideologies are so intricately entwined that separation may inevitably lead to incompletion or confusion. While some aspects of *kejawen* may differ from Islamic orthodoxy, most aspects of *kejawen* are agreeable to the *Sufi* form of Islam. When discussing syncretism it is important to understand that conflictions seen by the researcher is not seen by the people who are being researched. It is as important to accept no resolution than it is to provide an incorrect analysis.

Kejawen

The Javanese worldview is an elaborate system containing a cosmology, a mythology, metaphysics, and an anthropology. Together, these areas compile a set of ethical beliefs on how one should live their life and what their place is in the cosmological universe. This belief system is called *kejawen*. This system differs from the orthodox portion of Islam and understands the outside world as its essential text and the body as its holy book. 'Orthodox' Islam, to the contrary, promises heaven through the belief in one God, His Prophet, and ritual devotion to the Qur'an. (Beatty 1999: 158; Mulder 1996: 31).

Javanists can be defined as those who stress their Javanese cultural inheritance as primary and view their Muslim affiliations as secondary. These individuals are comparable to the *Santri-Abangan* differences in Islamic piety. For example, in Java there are those who practice *kejawen* at a deeper level and those who do not, and also, there is a broad middle area where individuals are indifferent. This provides a high level of flexibility to the Javanese, much like the *abangan* Muslims (Beatty 1999: 159).

The student of *kejawen* has a mindset that stresses the notion of reaching an inner truth and strength. This is in contrast to the pious Islamic student's rigid development of memorizing doctrine. For a *Javanist*, true meaning is acquired through insight, which can be spontaneous or an acquired skill. This is, likewise, opposed to the strict and rigid memorization that characterizes the students of the *santri*. Most of Javanese spiritualism is done through the acts of *rasakno dhewe* and *ngaji*. The former is to be told to *feel it for yourself*, while the later is translated to *recite* your own body. The *Javanist* is never told to think about the mystical truth, but rather, to dig, connect, or feel the awareness of what is missed on the surface level of existence (Beatty 1999: 161).

Javanists take complex ideas and simplify them so that one can be oriented. Manuals, scripts, and even symbols are useless unless one can understand the basic principles that must be *dibuktekaken* (proven) for oneself. Javanese knowledge is a practical philosophy and lives in discussion and practice rather than written texts. The texts are only valuable if the person reading them understands his place in the universe. The concept of tradition and passing on knowledge has a practical and systematic emphasis that is contrasted with the *Santri* notion of the truth found in scripture. The truth according to the *santri* is in scripture. This truth is beyond human interference and handed down directly from God. The Javanese phrases *urip utama* and *mati sampurna* means *superior life* and *perfect death*. Both are achieved through enlightened actions rather than enlightenment (Beatty 1999: 163, 164). Thus, for the *Javanist* the truth derives from the individual and what is found on the inside, versus, what is found in scripture and recitation. Scripture and symbols are used as assistance in finding the inner, personal truth. This personal truth will result in a union with God.

The *Javanists* relationship with God and the world is described through the term *rasa* (feeling). Knowing ones place in the hierarchical social order is reflective of the cosmological order and is essential in Javanese thought. The different meanings of *rasa*; bodily feeling, emotional feeling, awareness, inner meaning, or various refractions of God in the human consciousness, is a connecting force where God penetrates everything. *Rasa* is a physical sensation and an existing form of a subtle inner life force and a sign that there exists an inner life. *Rasa* is what is beyond the surface and the symbol, and the word that is the meaning of God (Beatty 1999: 165; Mulder 1996: 31, 32).

Kejawen is very much rooted in Hindu epics of the *Mahabharata* tales.[11] For example, *kebatin*, which means the *cultivation of ones self and inner being*, is central to *kejawen*. This is illustrated with the journey of Bima from the Dewaruci story in the *Mahabharata*. Essentially, Bima's journey to find the truth is challenging; in the end he encounters himself (Dewaruci) at the bottom of the ocean. After Bima enters through the ear of Dewaruci (himself), he becomes one with God and finds true meaning. The moral of the story is that only through oneself, can one understand the truth and existence of God and the cosmos. *Kebatin* is the journey from an origin to a destination and the re-absorption *of the All.* (Mulder 1996: 39, 40). The essence of *kejawen* is the idea that everything is part of the same whole, and through the cultivation of the inner self, one can understand the truth of *everything as one.*

The concept of the microcosms and macrocosms in Javanese thinking can be quickly described in four primary views. The views are interrelated, however, the Javanese tend to choose one or the other. The first is described as a metaphor used to explain the human body as a mirror to the world. The human body, then, has its own seas, mountains and sources of light.

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[11] The *Mahabharata* is the classical Hindu texts with epic tales of heroes and villains. These tales are reflected in the *Wayang Kulit* (shadow puppet) shows that are popular in Indonesia (primarily in Java and Bali).

Second, humans are patterned in relationship to the cosmos. Humans are at the center of an elaborate cosmology and humans are a key to this complex blueprint. Third, the body and the world are designed with *anasir papat* (the same four elements); earth, wind, fire, and water. Last, the world and man exist together (Beatty 1999: 170).

This belief system assists greatly when attempting to understand Javanese thinking. The Javanese idea that everything exists as part of a whole, or *all is one* helps to understand how multiple elements can exist in a single region. In Java there can be a 94.1% Islamic population with *kejawen*, the epics of the Hindu *Mahabharata* tales, and elements of Buddhism. The diverse ideologies and religious differences in Java can be brought together because of the ideology of *kejawen*. For the *Javanist*, if one looks through the surface of contrasting religious ideals and seeks to finds the truth of God and the universe, a basic tenant is the idea that everything exists in compliment not conflict. According to Mulder (1996: 39), the way to understand this whole, at the core, is the cultivation of *batin* (inner spirit).

Now that *kejawen* has been discussed there will be an accountability of how *kejawen* and Sufism relate to one another. *Sufism* is the form of Islam that emphasizes the direct and personal experience of God. This personal relationship with God is done through repetitious phrases that mention the names of God and intense meditation. This is the spiritual aspect of Islam and a balance for the rigid formalization of *Sharia*. This form of Islam fulfills the spiritual needs of human beings and can guide individuals in experiencing the direct relationship to God and God's qualities. If a Muslim belongs to a Sufi group, this group can provide a large sense of spiritual comfort. This spiritual comfort will assist this individual when considering existential matter, such as the purpose and meaning of life (Fealy and Hooker 2006: 102).

Sufism and Kejawen

To understand how *Sufism* and *kejawen* interact, historical texts can be a useful tool for providing a cultural perspective and interaction. Woodward (1989) discusses the importance of historical texts when analyzing cultures. Historical texts will illustrate the syncretic nature of early religious belief systems and Javanese practices. Historical texts will also show how religion can be used as the basis for political influence and motivation. Equally important, however, is that texts apply elements of cultural knowledge and these texts are the most detailed statements of cultural knowledge that are written from elite experts. According to Woodward, these elites can reach into various social classes in Java, while also giving a 'frozen' image of how certain cultural patterns evolved in the past (Woodward 1989: 49-52).

The origins of Islam in Java are obscure, however, research has shown that Muslims were present during the Indic court system of *Majapahit* as early as the fourteenth century (Woodward 1989: 8, Ricklefs 1993: 5). While the last Indic kingdom of *Majapahit* in Java fell in 1478, Hindu-Javanese inscriptions were found as late as 1486. While trade was an important factor in converting the Javanese to Islam, equally important is the influences of the *Sufi ulama* and Muslim kings who established Islam as the religion of central Java (Woodward 1989: 53).

Woodward argues that Javanese Islam was originally shaped and influenced by the combination of the *Kerala* community in southern India and the Muslim empires of *Deccan* areas of northern India. The former had a large influence from Arab tradition, while the later was dominated by the Indo-Persian religion and political structures. Combined, these two influences are seemingly the basic elements of Javanese Islam, which consists of elements from the *shafi'ite* (legal tradition) from southern India and the mystical theory and kingship of northern India. Together, both influences have shaped Javanese Islam in contemporary Javanese culture. The

most reasonable stop between Indonesia and Mecca for both pilgrims and traders is *Kerala* in Southern India (Woodward 1989: 54).

The relationship between the social orders of the *Kerala* in Southern India can be linked to the tradition of the *santri* communities in Java. More specifically, the *ulama* centric *pesantren* and *madrasah* (Islamic education systems) teaching styles in Java reflect the influences of the *Kerala* in Southern India. Both of these communities place a large emphasis on venerated Muslim saints, local origins, and ritual specialists. Likewise, the *Kerala* and *Deccan* both share support towards the *abangan* Muslims (Woodward 1989: 55, 56). The influences between these two communities in northern and southern India are important because it shows the initial diversity, complexity, and flexibility of Islam's entrance into Java. The nature and outcome of these influences in Java indicate a heavy emphasis on *Sufi* mysticism, while also an emphasis toward the pious *santri.*

The areas of interaction between northern and southern India should not be overlooked for two reasons. The first is that there is a link between the social and religious communities of Southern India's *Kerala* and the traditional Javanese *santri.* Likewise, in both areas there are ritual similarities, most notably, the five daily prayers, the Ramadan fasting month, pilgrimages to sacred graves, and the *slametan.*[12] The *Kerala* of southern India provides a potential illustration of an influence of Javanese social and religious organization (Woodward 1989: 57).

The large mystical emphasis in Indonesian Islam, however, suggests some researchers to argue that *Sufi* masters were the initial agents to spread Islam in Indonesia. This is because the period of Islamisation in Indonesia coincides with period when Sufi's dominated the greater

[12] The *slametan* is a ritual in Java that is held during many life-changing events. It can be used for a number of rites of passage and extends to all Javanese of all religions. The *Kerala* refer to the *slametan* as the *nercha.* In both areas the types of food are offered and distributed to the names of the spirits of saints in both societies (Woodward 1989: 57).

Islamic world. This was after the fall of Baghdad by the Mongols in AD 1258[13]. The first evidence of the existence of a Muslim Dynasty in Indonesia was on the Island of Sumatra, just west of Java, where a gravestone has been dated to AD 1297 (Ricklefs 1993: 4, 12-13).

While Woodward notes the obscurities of the initial spreading of Islam, he is convinced that the spread is largely *Sufi* influenced and, in his argument, Muslim Kings (Woodward 1989: 54). While there seems to be debate and inconsistency flashpoint of the spread of Islam in Indonesia, there seems to be agreement on the heavy *Sufi* influences in contemporary Indonesia. It is this heavy influence that can be applied to the pre-Islamic belief system of *kejawen.*

The first rise of Islamic states that dominated Java were secular monarchs and self-proclaimed saints. On the religious level, this was a contrast between the *Kerala* system that is dominated by Muslim clerics, and on the other side, the *Deccan* Indo-Persian imperial form from northern India. The northern Indian influence in Java suggests that this form of Islam shows the influence of the king and kingdom. More specifically, the king represents *Allah* on earth. This Indo-Persian influence of the Sultanate representing *Allah* on earth is still present in the Yogyakarta system in contemporary Java. Likewise, northern Indian influences can be found in Javanese ritual, most notably the *malud* ritual[14], which is illustrated through the Persian mystic *Al-Hallaj*. During the fifteenth century Indo-Persian mystical orders spread the doctrine of *identity*. This doctrine illustrates the identity of the creator and the created (the relationship between god and man) (Woodward 1989: 58).

Thus, it is possible that the conflict between the legalities and mysticism of Javanese Islam derives from the broader Islamic conflict between the mystic and legal scholars. This confliction between the legal aspects of Islam and mysticism can be seen in the influences of the

[13] The leading researcher for this argument is A.H. Johns (Ricklefs 1993: 12).
[14] The *malud* is a ritual that celebrates the birth and death of the Prophet Muhammad (Woodward 1989: 58).

opposing elements of the Arabic-*Keral* and the Indo-Persian interpretations. These interpretations illustrate the difference between the legal versus mystical interpretations of Islam (Woodward 1989: 58). The notion that Muslim traders had little to offer the Javanese elite, suggests that the conversion of the Javanese royalty to Islam was the product of Sufi masters who had connections to trade (Ricklefs 1974: 4). Considering that *Sufism* likely had a large presence in the elite portions of early Javanese Kingdoms, this would explain the large effects *Sufism* has had in the whole of Java and the greater archipelago.

The above discussion on the confliction between the legal and spiritual aspects of Islam in Java is essential when interpreting the fundamental arguments between contemporary forms of Islam in Java. Mysticism and 'orthodoxy' was and is a primary confliction between the *Sufi* practices and some of the *santri*. For example, there are those who argue that the way to please *Allah* is through following *Sharia* and those who emphasize the mystical union of self and *Allah*. The *ulama* and aspects of *Sufi* mysticism have been at odds with the basic elements of each belief from the earliest Islamic Kingdoms to contemporary Java. While some of the *ulama* see *Sufi* practices as a compromise for converting local masses and view the relationship between *Allah* and man as that of servitude, the *Sufi's* understand the personal relationship with *Allah* as a union through submission (Woodward 1989: 60).

The orthodox view of Islam supported by the *ulama* versus the mystical aspect of *Sufism* can explain the practices and compliments between *kejawen* and Islam. While the orthodoxy of Islam is fundamentally rooted in the Qur'an and depicts the rigidity of the model of religious scripture, it does not provide an ordered set of categories on cosmology, ethics, ritual and various other cultural aspects that are part of religion. Most importantly, however, is that there is *not* a

body of law. The *Hadith*[15] and the *Sharia* are aspects not found in the Qur'an and are subjected to the interpretations of what the prophet approved and disapproved of. Orthodox Islam is largely influenced by non-Muslim traditions, such as the very notion of 'orthodox' and 'purity'. What researchers have shown is that the prophet Muhammad provided for *Sufism*, not *Sharia* (Woodward 1989: 60, 61).

The analysis of the initial influences of *Sufism* in Java is important for this paper because it provides the division between Islamic ideologies and these influences that can be found in contemporary ideological disagreements. For example, the conflict between mysticism and legalities in Islam has been engaged in the past and in the present. This argument can be seen in the notion and concept of an Islamic state and the role Islam should play in Indonesian politics. Zainal Abidin Ahmad a leading modernist and Masyumi politician argues that the Prophet created an Islamic state and his companions continued this State. Whereas M.A. Sahal Mahfudh (president of NU) warns of implementing *sharia* without contextual consideration, according to Mahfudh, the implementing of *sharia* lies with the individual Muslims in the course of their everyday lives (Fealy and Hooker 2006: 157, 158, 210, 211).

In the case of Java and Indonesia more generally, it is important to mention the uniqueness of Islamic scholars, more specifically, the *kyai* of the *pesantren* (Islamic learning centers). Early *pesantrens* taught Islamic law, theology and *Sufism*. Contrary to the rest of the Muslim world, the Javanese *pesantrens* produced Islamic scholars who were both masters in Islamic theology and jurisprudence, while also earning the title of a *Sufi* master. Rather than *ulama* versus *Sufi* scholar, as per post Islamic modernism, these scholars adopted the term *kyai* to represent competence in both areas of Islam (Dhofier 1999: 14).

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[15] The *Hadith* is a usually short narrative that explains what the Prophet Muhammad approved and disapproved of. The *Hadith* and *Sharia* give aspects to Islamic doctrine and legalities that are not found in the Qur'an (Woodward 1989: 61)

In other areas of Islamic development such as the Middle East, the area of jurisprudence and *Sufism* tended to develop separate leaders. While in Java the two areas were combined, so the *kyai* was a master of Islamic jurisprudence as well as *Sufi* mysticism, to create a new, albeit, advanced and evolved, Islamic scholar or *kyai*. The training the *kyai* has in *Sufism*, Islamic law, and theology was then passed on to the their students, the *santri* (Dhofier 1999: 14). This is important because these scholars have a combined knowledge of the two opposing areas of Islam, legalities and mysticism.

To illustrate the aggregation between *Sufism* and *kejawen*, there are certain universal principles that are used to interpret and receive tradition, local culture, and religious knowledge in Java. These universal principles have four basic tenants; *Tawhid* (the unity of Allah), *batin* and *lahir* (distinction between inner and outer meanings), *rabb* and *gusti* (the relationship between god and humanity), and the equation of the microcosms and macrocosms shared by *Sufism* and the *kejawen* traditions (Woodward 1989: 69, 70).

Mulder (1996: 31-33) makes it emphatically clear that *kejawen* is not a religion but a practice; however, Mulder's description is isolated within the wording and context of a religious belief system. His observations fall short because, it does not note that *kejawen* can be extended to every aspect of Javanese life. While Mulder shows the elements and beliefs that constitute *kejawen* as a ideology, there lacks the explanation of the practical emphasis. The scope of *kejawen* extends to social, political, mystical, and idealistic realms in the Javanese belief system (Endraswara 2003: 6, 8). This gives *kejawen* the flexibility to not only compliment a religion, but also assist in political, economic, and social decision- making.

In terms of *Sufism* and *kejawen*, Beatty (1999) illustrate that *kejawen* can augment *Sufism*, while also having a practical and applicable world-view (Endraswara 2003: 6, 8). The

adherence of *kejawen* to *Sufism* can be found in the cardinal descriptions of *rasa*, order, the relationship between God and Humans, and the microcosms and macrocosms. The connection between *Sufism* and *kejawen* indicate that *Sufism* allows for an agreeable understanding between both practices. Islamic doctrine and orthodoxy such as *Sharia*, does not provide as much for the *kejawen* worldview (Woodward 1989: 69-74).

The concept of *tawhid* (Unity of Allah) is the central and arguably the most important doctrine in the Islamic faith. The *ulama* link *tawhid* with *sharia* centric piety, while the *Sufi's* understand *tawhid* as a personal relationship. The three levels of the *tawhid* are those who have a basic Islamic belief (i.e. the belief in *Allah*), those who strongly practice Islam, but seek personal gain and blessing, and those whose primary motive is to serve Allah. This last level is one agreeable element between the orthodox *ulama* and the *Sufi* mystics. Essentially, to serve Allah unconditionally is the ultimate non-existence of everything that is not *Allah*. *kejawen* mystics understand the notion of *kosong* (empty) in a similar sense, which is that anything other than *Allah* (including thought), is eliminated. The goal of the Javanese mystic is always with the infinite power and ever-present nature of *Allah* (Woodward 1989: 70-71).

Similarly, the Javanese concepts of *batin* (inner) and *lahir* (outer) existence are comparable to the Arabic terms *bātin* and *zahir*. In *Sufi* texts these terms outline the behaviors expected by the Qur'an, and with the inner mystical path to seek the knowledge of Allah. The interpretation of the *wadah* and *isi* are concepts that can link *kejawen* and *Sufism*. The *wadah* being a *container* and the *isi* being the *content*, the *wadah* is the physical, for example the universe, the body, the state and so forth. The *isi* is *Allah*, the Sultan, the soul, faith, and mysticism. In terms of the Javanese mystic, this may imply to what degree a Javanese mystic must adhere to the *sharia*. This is a highly contested issue (Woodward 1989: 71-73).

The last two areas to discuss are *kawula* and *gusti* (the servant/Lord relationship) and the microcosm and macrocosm equation, both have been discussed in the context of *kejawen*. Recall that in Javanese society and mysticism, cosmology is viewed as a hierarchy, and the term *rasa* has great importance (Beatty 1999: 165; Mulder 1996: 31, 32; Woodward 1989: 73). The relationship between god and man is central in Javanese religious thought and political theory. In Islam, the servant and Lord relationship centers on the concept of submission to *Allah* (Islam) and to orthodox *ulama* this means perfecting your relationship as a servant to please the needs of *Allah* (the master). To the *Sufi* mystic it is a union with *Allah*, the submission eventually equates to an understanding through a union. The Javanese use this in a broader sense and extend it to political theory, social hierarchy, and mystical thought. In Java, most *santri* do not accept the *kejawen* or *Sufi* position of a union with *Allah* as a metaphysical condition. (Woodward 1989: 75).

The microcosms and macrocosms of the *Sufi* tradition and Javanese *kejawen* complement each other, however, there are also elements of Hindu/Buddhist beliefs in that the equation reflects the geography and organization of the States. The *Sufis*, however, believe that the center of God and Human relationships are the hearts of the people. The *Ka'bah* (heart) is the house of god and the center of the cosmos, which equates to the center of creation. *Allah* and humanity are reflecting images, so the difference between the Hindu/Buddhist and *Sufi* tradition is the nature of the cosmos. In Java, Yogyakarta for example, the state and the palace are models of the cosmos. In Java, these elements are combined. The state (Yogyakarta for example) is modeled in a cosmos that is Islamic, while at the same time *kejawen* and *Sufi* mystics view humans as a mirror to *Allah's* attributes (Woodward 1989: 76, 77). The four central areas of *Sufism* can be used to show the links between the *Sufi* form of Islam and the concept of *kejawen*.

The importance of the analysis of *kejawen* and *Sufism* can be shown in varying aspects of Javanese culture. One large and important area is in the initial development of Indonesian political discourse. That is, the initial development of politics within Indonesia as an independent nation. Now that a background of the political environment and Islamic organiztions have been addressed, and an analysis of the importance of *Sufism* and *kejawen* have been discussed, there can be an example of how these elements interacted in the initial development Indonesia's constitution.

More specifically, what was the role and level of influence from Islam during this period? The following section will discuss Islam's role in Indonesia's political discourse and president Soekarno's political ideology. The former will reflect the role of Islamic more generally, while the later will consider the influences of *Sufism* and *kejawen* in the ideological beliefs of Soekarno.

Sufi and Javanese ideology During initial Political Discourse

"I am a convinced nationalist, a convinced Moslem, a convinced Marxist. My heart overflows with the synthesis of these three currents, and for me it is a mighty synthesis..."[16] -Soekarno-

This portion of the paper will explain the weighted influence of *Sufism* and *kejawen* found in the initial political development in Indonesia. With the early developments of Islamic organizations in mind, we can note their participation in the development of Indonesia's constitution. This portion will discuss Indonesia's first president Soekarno, his background, his isolation, and his *pancasila* ideology. The discussion on Soekarno will reflect his views on Islam and his role as a nationalist leader. The leader Soekarno will bring together the influences and

[16] In Dahm, Bernhard 1969 *Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence*. Trans. Mary F. Somers Heidhues. Pp. 200

the role of Islam to explain the initial political developments, and the outcome of the nation of Indonesia. More specifically, added to the ideologies of nationalism and Islam, Soekarno also combined the influences of Marxist-Communism.[17]

The example of Soekarno will bring the elements of *kejawen* and *Sufism* into the political discourse because; Sukarno was capable of utilizing the mysticism of Islam and *kejawen* to appeal to the elite and common Indonesians.

Pancasila was the creation of a political policy that mediates nearly every element and ideology present in Java at the beginning of Indonesian independence. Sukarno's *pancasila* was the basis for the Republics constitution then, and still exists as the foundation of Indonesia's Republic today. *Pancasila* was developed to cater to pluralism; tolerance, Islam, and Marxism yet it has restricted the amount of Islamic influence, more specifically, the institution of an Islamic state under *Sharia* law (Bharadawaj 1997: 63, 64).

Sukarno and Pancasila

Once the proper conditions emerge, and a parliament of our own, truly representative of the people, has come into being, the Sarekat Islam must not then end its activity; rather, it must continue to work for the strengthening of democracy and of Islam in Indonesia, and for the abolition of capitalism. What use is a government of our own if it is still controlled by adherents of capitalism and imperialism?[18]

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[17] *Communism* is encompassed in the works of Karl Marx (the *Communist Manifesto* 184) and Friedrich Engels (the *Principles of Communism*). Both authors participated in the works of the *Communist Manifesto*; the primary goal was class struggle and rebellion by the common people. *Marxist-Communism* is a model of government designed to destroy the upper class and free the lower class from oppression. *Communism* also requires the abolishing of religion and the absolute morality that religion defines. Historically, *Communism* has shown to result in totalitarian regimes that become increasingly oppressive to the people that *Communism* was written for. *Communism* and *Marxism* are interchangeable and have the same meaning. Source: http://www.allaboutphilosophy.org/communism.htm

[18] Sukarno, UH, May 6, 1921 (IPO 1921, No. 19, P. 263), as this reference was used in the translated version of Bernard Dahm's *Sukarno and the Indonesian Struggle for Independence*, translated by Mary F. Somers Heidhues, 1969 Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London.

In the nineteen hundreds when Islamic organizations were becoming involved in both the political and social arena, Indonesia's most influential and charismatic leader was, likewise, making his presence on a national level. Eventually making his mark on the international stage, Soekarno would become the charismatic face and leader of Indonesian nationalism. A leader is essential and indispensable in any revolution, whether political, religious, or social the role of the charismatic leader is a large factor when unifying various elements, many of which are at odds (Bharadwaj 1997: 63, 64). This section will integrate the influences of *Sufism* and *kejawen* that led to Soekarno's *pancasila* ideology.

More specifically, how this ideology brought together the various elements and factors discussed previously, combined with elements of Marxism and communal Javanese ideologies.[19] Soekarno's background assisted in the unification of three opposing ideologies under the theme of Indonesian nationalism using a Javanese background. This example will also indicate how Islam's diverse system can exist in an equally diverse environment. This accountability of Soekarno's ideology will show the role of *Sufism* and *Kejawen* in the initial drafting of Indonesia's constitution and identify the initial division between the notions of Islam and the Indonesian state.

Charismatic leaders have been considered in a variety of conditions, the common elements of a charismatic leader include a diverse background, high levels of vitality, intelligence, motivation, and originality that can attract the masses of large populations. The leader must be able to attract the common; less educated, while also convincing the elite and the intellectuals (Bharadwaj 1997: 65-66). Soekarno is a perfect example, particularly when

[19] Communal Javanese ideologies will refer to *gotong royong* (mutual cooperation), which is a village concept that requires mass cooperation from villages to accomplish one or more overarching goals (Karen! Indonesian Course Book 2 pp. 152 and Legge 1979: 186).

discussing the importance of Javanese ideology. The diversity of Soekarno's background, coupled with his ability to unite opposing ideologies is what made Soekarno an effective nationalist leader.

Soekarno's early education and political influence is essential in understanding the outcome of his *pancasila* ideology. Soekarno did not attend a *pesantren*, but rather, after the age of twelve, attended European schools, which introduced him to a diverse amount of recourses. From his birth, Soekarno was raised under a Javanese father and a Balinese mother, where he was taught traditional Javanese culture and the rules and behavior of the Javanese nobleman. Soekarno was also well versed in Hindu epics, which reflects in his later political campaign with *Wayang* performances.[20] This Javanese background gave Soekarno the ideologies of mysticism, religious/syncretic tolerance, and the precepts of *kejawen* (Bharadwaj 1997: 72-73).

Soekarno's early political influence adds to the diversity of his background. His initial political education was in Surabaya, east Java in the house of Tjokroaminoto, the founder of *Sarekat Islam*[21]. Indeed, in the early years Soekarno's 'mirror' was Tjokroaminoto, however, it must be made clear that Soekarno's primary political course was always nationalism, not Islam. Soekarno was allowed to develop his nationalistic views within the backdrop of Islamic and communist activities. His leadership, however, did not lean far to one ideology, but rather attempted to bridge the major differences as 'misunderstandings' between ideological interpretations. Soekarno effectively placed himself as the unifier of these differing ideologies. In the excerpt above, Soekarno implies the dominating presence of the nationalism and socialism of the 1900's, the abolishment of capitalism, a leaning toward communism, but a blatant strengthening of Islam (Dahm 1969: 43).

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[20] *Wayang* performances are shadow puppet plays that reflect epic Hindu tales. The form *Wayang Kulit* is popular in Java and Bali.

[21] The first mass organized Islamic group that preceded Muhammadiyah.

The role of Islam in Soekarno's leadership began with his early political education from Tjokroaminoto and continued when he moved to unite, and create synergy between, nationalism, Marxism, and Islamic ideologies. In the context of Soekarno's ideology, and indeed the nationalism of the time, Islam was often seen as the symbol of self-reliance and western rejection. Soekarno understood the challenges of linking nationalism with Islam and Marxism and he demonstrated his political abilities by simply confronting the Muslims, the Marxists, and the Nationalists (Bharadwaj 1997: 72, 73).

Soekarno laid out the rise and decline of Islam and compared this to developments in Indonesia (i.e. reformation) during the 1900's. Soekarno pointed to Islam as being responsible for western dominance; Islam's decline was the result of the usurping of last Caliphate by secular governments. Thus, it is a misconception for the Marxists to hold hostility toward Islam (because Marxism is centered on secular governance). However, nationalism in Islam can be drawn out with the Muslim irritations toward the *infidels*.[22] Conveniently, most of the *infidels* are not Indonesians they are the occupiers. This instills nationalist's feelings that will allow the compatibility between Nationalism, Marxism and Islam (Dahm 1969: 72).

Moreover, the Marxist ideology of redistribution is compatible with the Islamic notion of *zakat*[23] both concepts contain socialistic elements. Then, Soekarno turned to the Marxists and using Marxist jargon to prove his worth, assured the Marxists that calling for an end to nationalism and religious associations has been overruled by a greater cause.[24] The role of Marxism, then, is cooperation with both nationalists and Muslims. Praising the cooperation

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[22] *Infidel* refers to the non-believer, or one who rejects the blessings of God, literally means one without faith. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infidel

[23] *Zakat* is essentially, the Islamic definition of redistribution and one of the five tenants of Islam, where the richer Muslims are responsible for assisting the poorer Muslims in an Islamic society.

[24] By Marxist Jargon I am referring to terms that are familiar to Marxists, such as surplus value, accumulation, and pauperization (Dahm 1969: 71).

between the Marxists and Muslims in Afghanistan, Soekarno presented examples of cooperation between Marxists, nationalists, and Muslims in various circumstances. Soekarno brought all ideologies together and stressed national autonomy and the liberation of Indonesia is the primary goal, not the dismissal of ideologies (Dahm 1969: 72, 73).

Although Soekarno believed in *Allah*, he did not follow strictly, a religious dogma other than *kejawen*. *Kejawen* allowed Soekarno to access many belief systems, with a wide range of ideologies. It was during Soekarno's exile from the mid 1930's to the early 1940's on the Island of Flores, that he began writing to a sympathetic Muslim (A. Hasan) of the *Presuatan Islam* (Islamic Unity) in Badung. It is during exile that Soekarno began to read and consider Islamic ideology more thoroughly. From the beginning, Soekarno intensely criticized the idea of *sharia* on the condition that Islamic law completely dominates and overshadows the belief system (Dahm 1969: 179-180). Soekarno's initial criticism *sharia* is valuable because it shows an initial rejection of orthodoxy. The consideration towards spiritualism and the rejection of orthodoxy will prove consistent in Soekarno's version of Islamic relevance.

While the utilization of Islam could be linked to Sukarno's strong *kejawen* ideology, he was also looking for a way to promote and sustain nationalism for Indonesian independence without the institution of *sharia* and an Islamic state. Soekarno adopted the idea that Islam is progress, contrary to the common question posed by scholars that asks, "Is Islam hostile to progress?" Soekarno eventually attacked the book of the *Fikh,*[25] which, is a 1000-year-old book that has guided the everyday moral and ethical decisions of Muslim and the Muslim community. Even still, Soekarno referred the *Fikh* as the 'hangman of the soul and spirit of Islam'. As Dahm

[25] The *Fikh* is a book of Islamic legal teachings that has guides the behavior of Muslims over the course of one-thousand years (Dahm 1969: 192).

claims, Soekarno's interpretation of Islam was not so much based on 'submission' as it was 'progression' (Dahm 1969: 191-195).

The important element to consider is Soekarno's quick rejection of orthodox Islam. What is the implication of this rejection? For Soekarno, this rejection could mobilize Muslims into revolution, while also limiting the legalities of Islam in initial State and governmental political developments. By appealing to the mystical portion of Islam, Soekarno could give momentum to the Muslim majority (particularly secular Muslims), while ensuring early on, that Islam's role in legal aspects of the independent state would be limited. Soekarno's purpose was not to alienate the various forms of Islamic views, but rather, to unite and put to rest the controversy of the variants of Islam. As Soekarno understood this, the controversies must be put to rest through the spirit rather than the dogma, as Dahm (1969: 192) illustrates:

> *Let us not look at the letter; let us look at the spirit, the soul of the letter...In this way we can free Islam from the controversy over the letter, that is, the casuistry of the Faqih. In this way, we can think independently, comment independently, interpret independently, guided only by the one compass, the spirit of [true] Islam.*[26]

Two important issues must be addressed by Soekarno's proclamation and interpretation of Islam being an ideology of freethinking and personal relationships with *Allah*. First, it was not setting well with modernists (Mohammed Natsir for instance) who were quick to point out his deficiencies. This primary deficiency is a lack of devotion and submission to the will of *Allah*, which is the foundation of Islam. Secondly, the primary target for Soekarno's criticism, the orthodoxy (NU members for example), would eventually show interest in Sukarno's emphasis on the necessity of syncretism in local belief systems (Dahm 1969: 195-196).

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[26] As translated from Dahm 1969, pp. 192.

This is important because it shows how Soekarno adopted Islam as a form of nationalism, while at the same time taking a form of Islam that will seemingly prevent an Islamic state. Soekarno's Javanese background has reflected his ability to bring together nationalist, Marxist and Islamic ideals into a *kejawen* framework. This framework, as understood by Soekarno was looking through the surface of all ideologies and seeing them as compliments rather than conflictions. This framework and Soekarno's exploration of mysticism can be compared to his *kejawen* background and his partiality towards *Sufi* mysticism. It is this unity through diversity that is the foundation and the core of Soekarno's *pancasila* ideology.

The Japanese occupation is what brought Soekarno out of isolation and to the center of the political arena as the leader of the Indonesian independence movement. Unlike the Dutch, the Japanese ran a highly political, mass organizational, and largely ritual/ideological occupation. For Soekarno, this was ideal for the manipulation and shaping of a political platform (Legge 1979: 149).

Towards the end of the Japanese occupation in 1945, the organization of the BPKI (Investigating Body for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence) committee was formed to consider all aspects of political, administrative, and religious affairs to create an independent Indonesian state. In this committee, secular nationalists compromised 34%, while the Muslim intellects occupied only 11%. The territorial administrative corps and members drawn from the other main ethnic groups of Indonesia compromised the rest of the committee. It was through this committee that Soekarno was able to secure more power and influence to the secular nationalists (Legge 1979: 183).

The first preliminary assembly gathered on the 28th of May 1945. In the initial gathering, the BPKI was in danger of losing its momentum and was very slow in addressing decision

making and planning. This is when Soekarno stepped in and extinguished the arguments to give one of the most motivating speeches of his political career. This speech brought together Soekarno's ideology and political thought over the course of his twenty-year activity (Legge 1979: 183, 184). With the influences of nationalism, Marxism and Islam, Soekarno promoted his *pancasila* ideology under the *kejawen* precept of *everything exists as one*. This took the diversity of the ideologies of Marxism and Islam and intergraded both under the ideology of nationalism. Nationalism is what combined the struggle *from the northern tip of Sumatra to Papua*. These struggles do not exist independently, rather in cohesion under one nation state, Indonesia (Legge 1979: 184, 185).

Pancasila, or the *five principles* declare the belief in one God, a just and civilized society, national unity, democracy led by wisdom, and social justice (Fealy and Hooker 2003: xiv). Soekarno synthesized nationalism, Islam and Marxism by dissecting his five-fold ideology. Essentially he illustrated that these five principles are interrelated and dependent upon one another. Indeed, if Soekarno compressed these ideologies from five, to three and from three to one, the parts of *pancasila* is really one overarching whole. This interrelationship is reciprocated with the Indonesian term *gotong royong* (mutual cooperation) (Legge 1979: 186).[27]

Soekarno was effective in gaining support for *pancasila* because of his intellectually diverse background. The role and influence of *kejawen* is shown through Soekarno's ability to illustrate the compatibility, rather than the contradictions in each ideology and show the dependence on each ideology for the common goal of nationalism. By using the Javanese concept of *gotong royong*, Soekarno was able to appeal to the Marxist and the Islamic notion of

[27] *Gotong royong* is translated as cooperation, but it is much more than that. In Indonesian villages, or *desa*, the entire community comes together to do accomplish various things such as, the harvest, re-building or fixing things in the community and so forth. This illustrates the socialism that influenced Sukarno (Karen! Indonesian Course Book 2 pp. 152).

zakat (redistribution with socialist elements), while also appealing to the less-educated rural elements using a identifiable term. Through the precept of *everything is one* from *kejawen* and the notion of *gotong royong*, the example of Soekarno illustrates Bharadwaj's (1997: 65-66) definition of the common elements of a charismatic leader.

The Muslim intellects, however, were discouraged by a number of things. Most notably the recognition of other religions, when Indonesia was nearly 90% Muslim, and with certain reactions Soekarno had toward the non-secular Muslim minority. For example, at one point Soekarno emphasized that the non-secular Muslims held 11% of the BPKI and this minority would reflect in the political decision making of the committee. Essentially, Soekarno told the non-secular Muslim minority to understand their place. Thus, after the euphoria of Soekarno's charismatic speech faded, there were conflictions between the secular and non-secular Muslims on the practicalities of Islam involved in state ideology. This was inevitable because, while Soekarno's speech was motivating and inspiring, it lacked in specific practicalities, most specifically, the role of Islam in the ninety percent Muslim majority nation of Indonesia (Legge 1979: 186, 187).

The first major division concerning Islam's role in political Indonesia was the *Djakarta charter*. When the BPKI formed the sub-committee (chaired by Soekarno) to draft the constitution, the primary concern was the *Djakarta charter*. This was the first large confrontation between Islamic groups supporting and opposing an Islamic state (Legge 1979: 188; Fealy and Hooker 2006: 47). The *Djakarta charter* was seven words in bahasa Indonesian that allowed for the institution of *sharia* law for those who practiced Islam (Fealy and Hooker 2006: 47).

The wording of the *Djakarta charter* was vague and did not stress the implication for those who were orthodox Muslims and those who were *abangon* (nominal) Muslims. Would

Sharia be instituted to all Muslims or just the orthodox Muslims? Was it to be enforced by the state? Moreover, there was no specificity in *defining* an Islamic state and ultimately, while one committee accepted the *Djakarta charter*, it was dismissed by another committee and did not get included in the final draft of the Indonesian constitution (Legge 1979: 188; Fealy and Hooker 2006: 47).

In the development of Soekarno's national ideology, the non-secular Muslims did not gain the influence they had hoped for. There was a minority of non-secular Muslims in the BPKI and the *Djakarta charter* failed to be included in the Indonesian constitution. While Soekarno was a Muslim, his primary goal was nationalism, and his views on Islam as a political influence was only to assistance in independence. As far as Islam and non-secularism is concerned, Soekarno clearly sided with the secular Muslim nationalists and opposed an Islamic state.

Soekarno's partiality towards secularism is shown earlier in Soekarno's political career when he renounced the *Fikh* and non-secular Islamic ideology. Both he considered, as clouding the true nature of Islam. However, Sukarno was able to effectively motivate and unite differing ideologies under the precepts of *kejawen*, the cooperative term *gotong royong*, and the concept of nationalism. These areas encompassed the diverse ideologies present in Indonesia during the drafting of the Indonesian constitution, while also appealing to the masses. The notion and implementation of an Islamic state was set aside and left out of the constitution and is the first major confliction between those Muslims who support an Islamic state and those Muslims who do not (Dahm 1969: 191-195; Fealy and Hooker 2006: 47).

Conclusion

In this paper there was a consideration of Islam's initial influences and level of involvement in the early political development in Indonesia. A background of Islam and how Islam exists in Indonesia, with specific attention to Java, was discussed (Armstrong 2002: xiv, 25; Momen 1985: 12; Fealy and Hooker 2006: 39-41, 49; Mulder 1996: 31; Beatty 1999: 1). The political environment of the early 1900's to 1945 in Indonesia was discussed with an emphasis on diverse political ideologies, Islamic organizations, and Soekarno's *pancasila* ideology. There was also a consideration of the misunderstandings between classifications of Muslims that have recently dominated literature and research (Dahm 1969: 195-196; Feith and Castles 1970: 1, 123, 201; Kahin 1952: 64, 87-88, 106-111, 156; Ricklefs 1993: 171; Barton and Fealy 1996: 1-13, 17-21).

The analysis of the form of *Sufism* and *kejawen* gave an understanding of the early *Sufi* influences in Java that may have been a combination of Northern and Southern Indian influences, or the product of the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in AD 1258. On the one hand, there is a reflection of the orthodox *ulama* and *kyai*, while on the other hand, the mystical *Sufi* practices. The early Sufi influences in Java helped to explain the complexity and division of ideologies between the doctrinal practices of the Mystics versus the Islamic clerics (Woodward 1989: 54-56; Ricklefs 1993: 4, 12-13). The *kyai* are a unique form of Muslim scholars who are well versed in the legalities of Islam as well as Sufi masters. This allows the *kyai* the diversity and knowledge to understand the entirety of Islam, both in a spiritual and practical sense (Dhofier 1999: 14).

The close relationship between *Sufism* and *kejawen* has shown compatibility and the ideology of *kejawen* extends to religious, political, and social ideologies (Endraswara 2003: 6,

8). Because of *kejawen's* flexibility, various religions and ideologies can exist together without the resolution between various doctrinal discrepancies. *Kejawen* and *Sufism* are closely linked in terms of cosmology, mythology, metaphysics and their anthropologies. The Javanese extend the practice of *kejawen* to political theory and this can be exemplified by Soekarno's use of combining differing ideologies under nationalism, using the basic *kejawen* precept of *everything existing as one* ideology.

To show how *kejawen* and *Sufism* played a role in initial political discourse, the nationalist leader and first president of Indonesia, Soekarno; proved to be an ideal example. This was due to his diverse background and upbringing in the traditional Javanese lifestyle (Bharadwaj 1997: 63-66, 72-73). While Soekarno did not place a large emphasis on Islam until his isolation, there he chose to side with the mystical aspects of *Sufism* while rejecting Islam's legalities and jurisprudence. It is through the rejection of orthodoxy that illustrates Sukarno's motives. By dismissing orthodoxy and embracing mysticism, Soekarno could effectively limit an Islamic state and create synergy between differing ideologies (Dahm 1969: 72, 73, 179-180, 191-196). Soekarno accomplished this synergy by finding the underlying compliments rather than focusing on the contrasts. According to Soekarno, it is the mystical form of Islam rather than its orthodoxy that represents the true nature and spirit of the Islamic religion.

Soekarno's *pancasila* ideology extended this notion and condensed Soekarno's political ideology over the course of his twenty-year trek. Soekarno pushed *pancasila* as a political and ideological philosophy that accepted all influences during this period of Indonesian history. Soekarno's knowledge of Marxist-communism, Islam, and nationalism effectively allowed him to condense these ideologies (as he saw them) into one using, once again, the precept of *oneness* and *gotong royong*. With the *kejawen* ideology and the communal village notion of *gotong*

royong (mutual cooperation), Soekarno instituted his *pancasila* ideology into the last paragraph of the Indonesian constitution (Legge 1979: 183-186).

Islam's role, more generally, was divided. This first division in the initial development of Indonesian politics was over the *Djakarta Charter*, which proposed to implement *Sharia* law on the 88% Muslim majority. The secular Muslims prevailed in the initial political process because the non-secular Muslim only occupied 11% of the BPKI. Therefore, the non-secular minority were sidelined and marginalized in the final draft of the constitution. The failure of the *Djakarta Charter* to be implemented illustrates this defeat (Legge 1979: 186, 187; Fealy and Hooker 2006: 47).

By understanding the political environment in Indonesia from the early twentieth century to the drafting of it's constitution, while also integrating the origins and belief systems in Java (*Sufism* and *kejawen*), one can begin to understand how a leader such as Soekarno could develop the policy of *pancasila*. Moreover, by addressing the various forms of Islam, while weighing heavily towards *Sufism*, one can see the level of influence mysticism has in Java. This also shows how Islam more generally, can exist and maintain a balance in an area where there is a high level of diversity, pluralism and syncretism. Thus, with the background of the political environment, the analysis of *Sufism* and *kejawen*, and a discussion of Soekarno's *pancasila* we can see that the influence of *Sufism* and *kejawen* on the political policy of *pancasila* contributed greatly in early Indonesian political discourse. The role of Islam more generally, is a more problematic question.

As mentioned the role of secular Muslims had a much larger role in the initial political process in Indonesia. This could be in large part, because of Soekarno's heavy role as a nationalist and secular leader. However, within the large Islamic organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah, there are heavy numbers of Muslims that found the idea of an Islamic state

problematic. For example the pragmatists in the traditional Muslim group NU. Soekarno's ideologies appealed to the moderate and there are large portions of moderate secularist Muslims within NU and Muhammadiyah. This ensured that the role of non-secular Islam as a political force would be minimized.

However, the *belief in one God* statement in *pancasila* could be seen by the non-secular Muslims as an advantage, because, this statement assumes that this one God is *Allah*, given that Indonesia is 88% Muslim. But, the *Djakarta Charter* was a significant set back for the non-secularists and will prove to continue to be minimized in the future (Fealy and Hooker 2006: 47). Thus, in terms of the *role* that Islam played in the initial development of the Indonesian constitution is more complex. The amount of Muslims involved during the development of Indonesia, as a nation state is, of course, the majority. Within the BPKI there was a clear Muslim dominance, however, what *form* of Islamic ideology is what must be considered. More specifically, how the varying Muslims *interpret* the role of Islam in state society is more accurate than simply saying, what is the role of Islam in Indonesian politics?

When studying political Islam in Indonesia a sufficient place to begin is during the revolution and independence period. This is when the country of Indonesia and the religion of Islam developed into a political force. The divisions between the traditionalists and modernists during the initial development of the constitution are also present in contemporary Indonesian society. The notion of the State and Islam are still contested from both angles. Islam in Indonesia is still evolving internally, and its dynamics is becoming increasingly complicated.

I chose the Indonesian independence period as a starting point. To attempt an analysis of contemporary Islamic politics in Indonesia, it is necessary to consider how Islam, and what forms of Islam, contributed to the initial development of Indonesia as a nation state. There are

many other ways to consider the various forms of Islam. In all considerations, Indonesia can be a primary example of how Islam exists among diversity, pluralism, and syncretism.

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